Abstract: The core of the argument of this article is that the integration of Islamic notions of justice into transitional justice mechanisms in the MENA makes for a more viable and sustainable transitional justice process in the region. This would mean a critical cultural value in the MENA is given a place in dealing with the past and mapping out a sustainable future in the region. The argument here is premised on the logic that a social transformation-focused enterprise like transitional justice ought to engage with Islam for sustainable outcomes in societies in the MENA where Islam is very influential. Given the significant role and influence of Islam on cultural, socio-political and legal institutions in the MENA, a process of transitional justice that takes account of Islamic values and practices is important for negotiating justice and institutionalising reforms in societies in the region.
violations of human rights with the support of Western governments. 3 The situation in the MENA continues to have significant impact on the course of international relations, world trade and global politics and lately, the emergence of a humanitarian crisis of grave proportions that has led to mass migration to Europe. Authoritarianism and conflict in the region has spawned violence and extremism across the world. The recent experience of the 'Arab awakening'
4 -a revolt against authoritarianism -in the MENA has led to limited opening up of the political space even if with limited gains such as the institution of democratic governance in Tunisia and the now paradoxical democratic process in Egypt. This trend is expected to intensify as the Arab awakening takes firmer hold in the various states across the MENA given that its impact has produced change that has not been witnessed in about six decades in the region. 5 There is also political transition in post-war Iraq. Each of these situations and others across the MENA calls to mind the relevance of measures to address the needs of victims and institutional reforms in various parts of the region. There is both a normative and pragmatic need to provide redress for the gross violations of human rights that have ensued from mostly the actions of the state but also from non-state actors in the region at some point in time with some countries requiring processes of transitional justice at this time as is now the case in Tunisia, and others conceivably in a not too distant future as with Iraq for instance. The core of the argument of this article is that the integration of Islamic notions of justice into transitional justice mechanisms in the MENA makes for a more viable and sustainable transitional justice process in the region. This would mean a critical cultural value in the MENA is given a place in dealing with the past and mapping out a sustainable future in the region. The argument here is premised on the logic that a social transformation-focused enterprise like transitional justice ought to engage with Islam for sustainable outcomes in societies in the MENA where Islam is very influential. 6 Given the significant role and influence of Islam on cultural, socio-political and legal institutions in the MENA, a process of transitional justice that takes account of Islamic values and practices is important for negotiating justice and institutionalising reforms in societies in the region.
Recognition that religion has a strong influence on human beliefs and attitudes 7 has led to exploration of its role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. 8 There is also a developing recognition on the need for transitional justice as an interdisciplinary field to engage with religion. 9 However, this developing body of work has focused primarily on Christian societies. The work of Daniel Philpott is the most prominent in this regard, suggesting that Christianity has had a strong positive impact on the process of truth-telling and a moderate but nonetheless noticeable one on punitive justice measures.
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Many majority-Muslim societies have been at the coal-face of conflict and authoritarian rule, but there is sparse consideration given to the need to engage with Islam in the design and implementation of the transitional justice mechanisms and processes. Recent developments around transitional justice in the MENA in the shadows of the Arab-awakening inform the need to address this important gap which is the aim of this article. The structure of this article is as follows: Section one examines the concern about the legitimacy of transitional justice processes generally and with specific reference to the MENA. The legitimacy of social, legal and political processes is important to their viability and this is the case also (if not more so) for a contentious and typically ambitious project of transitional justice in postauthoritarian or post-conflict societies. Section two examines the pattern of exclusion of religion from transitional justice and argues that this is one of the problematic ways in which the processes and mechanism sometimes lack legitimacy. Section three advances the case for taking account of Islam in transitional justice processes in the MENA. What emerges from the analysis is that a combination of three factors firmly suggest the positive need to recalibrate current and future transitional justice in the region to take account of Islam: the reality that there is a religious resurgence across the world; the fact that the MENA is easily one of the regions where religion plays a central role in social ordering; and lastly, the affinity of certain transitional justice ethics like reconciliation with religion. The conclusion drawn is that a transitional justice approach in the MENA that takes account of Islam has significant potential for addressing legitimacy concerns and increasing the viability of the project in that part of the world.
Transitional Justice and Legitimacy
The legitimacy of legal and political processes is important to their viability.
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Legitimacy has been defined by Tyler as 'the belief that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just.' 12 Hurd defines legitimacy as 'the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.' 13 For Suchman, legitimacy is 'a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.'
Legitimacy is critical to the viability of any organisation, institution or mechanism because it allows people to defer to legal and various forms of authority or social arrangements.
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Internalised norms of justice play a key role in how people respond to legal measures and social institutions. Close alignment between prevalent notions of justice among citizens and the law or social arrangements makes for greater compliance and uptake by citizens thereby reducing the cost of enforcement of laws and improving viability of social arrangements as applicable. 16 Social institutions require legitimacy 'to develop, operate and reproduce themselves effectively'. 17 Thus, legitimacy is relevant for example to the work of national, regional and international courts. 18 International human rights and criminal justice courts and tribunals have struggled with legitimacy issues. 19 The concern about legitimacy and the challenge it poses to their work is one of the major reasons why unlike domestic courts, public outreach programmes are considered critical to the success and viability of international (ised) tribunals. 20 This is to ensure they convey their work procedures (including prosecutorial choices) to their publics and connect with the local environment. There are two main forms in which legitimacy is analysed in political philosophy and legal theory. There is the descriptive or sociological form which focuses on whether those who are the subject of a specific policy, norm, institution, unit or body like the state or an organisation, view it as legitimate and thus deserving of their compliance. 22 The second form of legitimacy is normative in nature and this takes into account whether the assumption underlying the descriptive sense of the concept is correct by investigating if it fulfils certain conditions. 23 Both the descriptive and normative forms of legitimacy are important to the operationalization of transitional justice as a project driven by the international human rights movement, seeking to secure justice for victims of gross violations of human rights and bringing about social reforms in troubled societies. The justice and rule of law arrangements, as well as institutional reforms which are the purview of transitional justice mechanisms and processes in periods of political change, have to be delivered to varying societies across the world. However, neither justice nor the rule of law -or for that matter, human rights -is value-free. Conceptions of social reform, institutional organisation or indeed, the notion of the 'good society,' 24 are all value-laden as no legal, social or political system operates in a vacuum. It is possible to construct a legitimacy model for transitional justice. Oomen offers a general model of the legitimacy of transitional justice mechanisms and institutions. The model proposes three components of legitimacy: input, demos and output. The input element refers to seeking out the design of the transitional justice mechanisms and processes from the people and society affected by the violations in issue, taking into consideration among others, their religious values and world view. The demos have to do with the acceptance by the relevant stakeholders of the authority which sets-up the transitional justice mechanisms, while the output refers to the outcomes of the processes. Each strand of legitimacy must be established to optimise transitional justice. 25 Arguably, the input aspect remains the most critical element as it would have significant implications for the nature of the demos and the output in some form or the other. That input element is the main concern of the analysis here.
In light of the contemporary roots of transitional justice in universal human rights and democratisation agenda of the post-World War II period, 26 it is not unexpected that the legitimacy of transitional justice arrangements has come under scrutiny. 27 In any case, as mentioned earlier, justice mechanisms at various levels have faced legitimacy challenges. Questions have been raised about the legitimacy of transitional justice mechanisms and processes.
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This has been the case in recent times with the deployment of transitional justice mechanisms in societies and countries in the global south. There is for instance growing disenchantment of a considerable number of African leaders and even the African Union with the International Criminal Court (ICC) for its alleged biased focus on 'situations' in the continent and selective prosecution to the neglect of other regions deserving of its attention.
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However, while the current position of many African leaders regarding the ICC is an important illustration of a major challenge regarding the legitimacy of the ICC as a transitional justice mechanism, it is fair to note that the legitimacy challenge on this score is essentially political. A balanced The type of challenge to the legitimacy of the transitional justice project as currently constituted that is of interest here is the sort of criticism recently made by Abdullah An-Na'im. An-Na'im raised concern that 'the grand "modernizing" mission of North Atlantic societies' which imposes 'neo-colonial' approaches to peacebuilding undermines 'indigenous formations of transitional justice'.
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According to An-Na'im, the implied assumption of [transitional justice] … is that the 'developing' society under examination is in transition from the state of being A, which we know, to becoming B, which we can predict. The precise question or theme of the study may vary, but the underlying inquiry seems to be whether that society can still maintain an acceptable level of what we, the 'international community', recognize as justice during transition. 33 He further argues that transitional justice 'must be homegrown, emerging out of local context and adapted by the people themselves to the specific conditions of their country, through practice, and not as normative ideals imposed from above.' 34 In similar vein, Oomen has argued that legitimacy is the 'core feature' that links 'transitional justice institutions to sustainable peace.'
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While identifying with the mechanisms and goals of transitional justice as part of the international system, others have called for 'institutional humility' of international law. 36 In this regard, Nickson and Braithwaite have argued for the need for 'deeper, broader and longer' transitional justice as a strategy for narrowing the rather wide expectations citizens have of transitional justice Mutua has similarly noted that for transitional justice to become a more 'robust project' in troubled societies there is a need for close attention to the 'context and location.' 42 Those involved in the transitional justice project need to embrace notions of justice that are 'informed by a wider moral and social universe' rather than the deemed normative universality of international human rights law. 43 Such an approach includes at the least, a place for The conversations on transitional justice in the MENA among international organisations (IOs) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), civil society groups, scholars and policy groups have proceeded with virtually no reference to religious leaders or the role Islam can play in bringing about justice and institutional reforms in the region. To illustrate this point, take the views expressed by an important contributor to the discourse: the Special Rapporteur. He noted the 'distinctive characteristics' of transitions in the MENA in this way: a common feature of these recent transitions is the prominent role that claims relating to economic rights occupy in these transitions; claims against corruption and in favour of economic opportunities have been raised to a par in the regions with claims for the redress of violations of civil and political rights.
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The issues raised are no doubt important as they highlight the need to focus on structural injustice or violence -violations of economic and social rights and embedded injustice in the social fabric of the societies -but the claim as to their distinctiveness in the transitional context is at best late in time. Such concerns are very important but inattention to them by the transitional justice project has been raised with reference to transitions elsewhere. 54 The concerns arise from 56 Arguably, the distinctiveness of transitional justice in the MENA is located in identifying and reckoning with the dynamics of the socio-cultural norms of justice in the region.
To be fair, the Special Rapporteur's view is situated in the foundations of contemporary practices of transitional justice. The transitional justice template is generally framed in secular terms and usually in the legal language of international law. 57 The current developments and arrangements for transitional justice in the MENA have naturally adopted that approach. The neglect in exploring the relevance of religion as a viable contributor to conflict transformation or securing justice and achieving reconciliation after periods of political turmoil or authoritarianism can be linked to the view that religion -a 'system of belief and practice'-58 particularly in the post-enlightenment age, is an anachronism. The Northern Ireland experience of transitional justice following the peace process embodied in the Belfast Good Friday Agreement (1998) exemplifies the institutionalised view that religion and transitional justice should not mix based largely on the foundations of transitional justice on international human rights. 59 Brewer, Mitchell and Leavey have noted that while the 'substance of conflict' in Northern Ireland 'was thoroughly political', 60 Northern Ireland is such an 'extremely religious society' 61 where even for those who are not actively religious, religion is a 'cultural reality.' 62 'Religion' they stated further, 'is seen as both outside the domain of human rights and, indeed, part of the problem that causes human rights abuses in the first place.' 63 Consequently, the dominance of the 'liberal human rights paradigm' excluded engagement with the role of religion in the transitional justice discourse on the important issue of excombatants in the Northern Ireland troubles. This is despite the prominent role some religious leaders have played in such processes like the case with South Africa 64 and Sierra Leone. Indeed, the unintended but prominent role Christianity played in the South Africa TRC process has been criticised by some scholars. 65 Brewer, Mitchell and Leavey's observation on the virtual lack of advertence to religion in transitional justice discourse in Northern Ireland is even more acute with respect to the MENA and majority-Muslim countries in transition. This is in view of the abiding influence of Islam on the lives of Muslims who constitute majority of the population of the MENA. Moreover, there is the fact that Islam is a matter of political discourse in the region. As Saud observes the 21st century has thus far been dominated by talk about Islam and political movement within the Muslim world. This talk has not been merely talk, but a political discourse according to which military and economic policies have been articulated. It is difficult to believe though that Islam is everywhere, yet nowhere to be found when Arab Muslims peacefully pursue democracy; but this is exactly what some experts want you to believe. 66 The exclusion of religion in the formal design and implementation of transitional justice is a reflection of the fact that religion has become a contested issue in contemporary societies and especially in the West. 67 The approach manifests the tension between religion and the public sphere that gained currency in the post-Enlightenment period in Europe. 
Transitional Justice in the Middle East and North Africa
Further, there has been much focus on religion as a source of conflict and violence. It is undoubtedly the case that many people have and are still being killed in the name of religion. So, religion has come to be viewed as a 'driver of violence'. 68 This view finds expression in the close association that is made between political or other forms of social violence and religion in societies where religion is a prominent cultural fact like majority-Muslim countries 69 and even other countries where Muslims constitute a visible minority as is the case in a number of Western countries like Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. 70 In the circumstance that religion can and has been mobilised in various ways for furthering the cause of conflict, terror and war, it is not surprising that only marginal attention has been devoted to what positive role religion can actually play in social transformation in societies where it has considerable influence. The experience of increased global visibility of religion in the public sphere has led to a description of the twentieth century as 'God's Century.' 71 There is evidence to support the view that despite vigorous attempts at secularization of the public sphere, there has been a resurgence of the influence of religion in all parts of the world, including Western Europe. 72 For example, religion has returned to the public sphere in the former Soviet Republics where it was officially repressed or banished into a limited private space. According to Sherrie Steiner, more 'than 90 % of people in the world adhere to one of the major religions.' 73 Religion has much to offer political reconciliation practices now required in the MENA. Notwithstanding the framing of transitional justice in secular terms, important aspects of the conceptual approach of transitional justice, even if only subliminally, lend themselves to identification with important religious values of truth, forgiveness and reconciliation. This is because religion is a major 'carrier' of ethics of reconciliation. Religion has the potential for making major contributions to the conception of justice by believers in dealing with past experiences of injustice. 83 In this regard, Philpott has identified an 'ethic of political reconciliation' in societies recovering from a legacy of injustice. This ethic finds 'thorough' expression in religion, specifically, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. As a 'restorative ethic,' reconciliation animates six critical practices relevant to 'political proceedings': building socially just institutions, acknowledgment, reparations, punishment, apology and forgiveness even though combinations of these would be regarded as odd bed fellows in the 'liberal human rights paradigm' institutionalised by the west. He convincingly argues that there are sound reasons for recognising an important role for religion in societies recovering from troubles whether or not the people are religious. An important reason for this is that secular rationales are compatible with 'religious justifications' for political reconciliation practices.
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Furthermore, transitional justice processes engage social, cultural, political and legal issues in societies in transition. The handling of such issues is strongly influenced by Islam in predominantly Muslim societies and especially those in the MENA. Thus far, the analysis has focused on the case for adverting to Islam in transitional justice contexts in the MENA. Meanwhile, with the establishment of international criminal tribunals, criminal trials have become one of the most definitive features of transitional justice in the post-Nuremberg period. 90 The prosecutions for gross violations of human rights at the national, but most prominently, at the international level have followed, in the words of Kathryn Sikkink, a 'justice cascade'. 91 According to Luc Huyse, prosecution is 'by far the most radical interpretation of acknowledgment and accountability' 92 which are the two core features of the transitional justice project.
However, the prioritisation of trials in the transitional justice project has raised concerns on the appropriate role of victims of gross violations of human rights. 93 The trial process privileges the international system or the State typically relegating the status of the victim. Such privileging is problematic in whichever form it takes. The State and its institutions (or some of them) is usually directly or at least indirectly complicit in gross violations of human rights which are being addressed and this may generate antagonism from victims. For the international system, while it may be considered as a positive that it is a neutral agent in contrast with a likely complicit State, the fact of its remoteness or distance could create other major problems. Victims could feel a sense of disconnection if not imposition by the trial process. Either of these may generate in victims, feelings of disinterest in the process or lack of satisfaction with the procedures and outcomes. The Islamic legal system offers an approach that could be pragmatic especially for a considerable number of people in various societies and across countries in the MENA. It is thus important to take this into account in the design and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms there. However before moving on to that, it serves the argument advanced so far to illustrate with a concrete instance of the operation of transitional justice in a momentous period in Islamic history.
A Classic Example of Transitional Justice in Islamic History
If transitional justice is concerned at least in part with conflict transformation and sustainable peace in the context of complex political changes as well as justice, then it is useful to refer here to an experience of political accommodation with a view to instituting peace in the earliest epoch of the Islamic era. But before going further it is relevant to advert to the debate about the historicisation of transitional justice namely when did transitional justice begin? Some have argued that transitional justice is a twentieth century phenomenon (much like the view held in some quarters about the history of human rights) which emerged as part of the responses to the experiences of the Second World War. 94 Others like Jon Elster have, through a historiographical account, traced a longstanding practice of transitional justice. 95 On this latter view, seeking justice following periods of wide spread repression or aftermath of mass atrocities is not new. David Dyzenhaus states in this regard that it is the 'label' (transitional justice) that is new, not the 'topic'. On this account, societies that have desired to break with a troubled past marked by injustice and repression have adopted various measures in their bid to usher in a 'better future'. 96 It is this approach to the historicisation of transitional justice that is adopted here not the least because it highlights and acknowledges, even if implicitly, an important role played by religion and religious figures in the development of aspects of what we now refer to as transitional justice.
It is useful in this regard to illustrate the experience of transitional justice in the classic Islamic period as that period of Islamic history continues to have deep resonance in one way or the other with most Muslims till today. The conquest of Makkah in 630 C.E is a milestone in Islamic history as it marked the consolidation of the Muslim community established by Prophet Muhammad and his followers in Madina. The Prophet and his followers had been persecuted in Makkah for thirteen years before he and many of them went on exile and migrated to Madina. The nascent Muslim group in Makkah had suffered deprivation; economic, social and political boycott, physical and mental torture and even, in some cases, murder, for thirteen years in the hands of their own people; the powerful and much respected tribe of Quraysh, for accepting the message brought by Prophet Muhammad.
Even after the emigration of the Muslims, the nascent community in Madina had to contend with economic, social and political pressure from the Quraysh of Makkah who not only confiscated their properties in Makkah but also waged war against the Muslim community of Madina in several battles. Following a breach of a negotiated truce between the parties by the Quraysh, Prophet Muhammad set out in 630 C.E., eight years after his departure from that ignores religion does so only to its 'detriment.' 99 This is especially pertinent in societies where religion, and or religious leaders play a 'pivotal role' in sociopolitical affairs, since religion can be effectively used as consensus-builder for reconciliation practices. 100 While the Islamic legal system is not currently referenced in the transitional justice discourse generally, and on victims' rights specifically, it is noteworthy that it provides a markedly different approach to participation and status of victims from the dominant system based on international human rights.
Broadening Transitional Justice -The Role of Victims in the Islamic Legal Tradition
The Islamic system provides a comparative exception to the relegation of the role of the victim by the State in the criminal justice system. Importantly, the system on this score has not only a comparative value, but direct relevance in the context of the practice and application of transitional justice measures. The Islamic approach to victims offers opportunity for broadening transitional justice as conceived by those concerned about the rather limited opportunities for justice offered by the current narrow framing of the project. Islam provides a central role for victims within the criminal justice framework. This is important in view of the fact that criminal justice, as stated earlier, dominates the landscape of transitional justice in the handling of impunity. In light of the fact that virtually all the countries in the MENA have a socio-legal system which recognizes or operates aspects of Islamic law, incorporation of the Islamic perspectives for dealing with impunity provides an opening for securing justice for victims of impunity in the MENA as opportunities for transitional justice emerge in the region.
Islam as a way of life with a holistic approach to individual and communal life, has prescriptions for crime and the role of victims which constitute part of its criminal justice system alongside a civil justice system (with overlaps between the two systems in some areas). 101 The victim plays a key role in the Islamic criminal justice system adapted to varying extents in many Muslim countries. Victim compensation for crimes is a fundamental aspect of Islamic law. 102 The Islamic legal system recognizes three categories of crimes: Hadd (plural Huduud), Qisas and Ta'zir. These categories determine the kinds of penalties that attach to the crimes and the level of discretion (or lack of it) granted to the judge. 103 The literal meaning of Hadd is 'limit' and in its technical usage, it refers to the limit of action set by divine prescription in the foundational or 'constitutional' sources of Islamic law; the Qur'an and Sunnah (sayings and approved practices of Prophet Muhammad) regarded as the normative basis of the Islamic legal tradition. 104 When this limit is exceeded or transgressed, then a crime of a serious nature is committed because violating hadd is considered to be an offence against God and the socio-legal order God has ordained. In other words, it constitutes a violation of limits for action imposed by God. 105 Hadd offences are mainly regarded as victimless crimes, or where there is a victim, s/he is only peripheral to the crime committed. 106 For efficiency and to deter impunity, it is generally considered that prosecution of such crimes are best left to the State. 107 Therefore, the intervention of victims is reduced to a minimum in deference to a mandatory regime of punishments prescribed by Islamic law. However, where there is a victim whose rights are directly violated, the interest of such a victim will be recognized.
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There are five universally agreed Huduud crimes in Islamic criminal law: hirabah -highway robbery; zina -fornication or adultery depending on the marital status of the defendant; sarqa -stealing; shrub al-khamr -consuming alcohol; qadhf -defamation of a person's chastity or sexual slander. There is no consensus on the definition and elements of two others; baghi -armed rebellion and ridda -apostasy. 109 The State initiates the proceedings and the victim generally has the limited role of witness and the offence is deemed to be a matter of public nature. 110 This is because the crime committed is deemed to be disruptive of social harmony 111 and in violation of the five core objectives of Islam (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa): the protection and preservation of life, religion, sound intellect, lineage, and property. 112 Accordingly, the punishment for such violation is mandatory and as set out in the primary sources of Shari'a and Islamic law, just like the offence itself. 113 Nonetheless, from a practical point of view, the absence of a report by the victim means the crime cannot be successfully prosecuted as there are strict evidentiary requirements for establishing such crimes. 114 Moreover, the strict evidentiary rules as well as required social considerations for its implementation limit the actual occasions for the appropriate application of punishments for hadd crimes. This is the basis for suspending the implementation of the punishment for theft in a period of famine for instance.
The foregoing verses indicate not only the important role of the victim, but also the paramount nature of the prerogative of mercy or pardon solely conferred on the individual rather than the State in contrast with the standard practice in western legal systems. This is because, despite the element of punishment, there is clear encouragement of remission and no compulsion in the direction of punishment. 122 There is ample room for forgiveness and reconciliation between victim and offender and in some cases, even the families on both sides.
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Ta'zir crimes are a residual category not covered either by Huduud or Qisas.
124 Ta'zir, meaning 'chastisement' for improper behaviour or discretionary penalty, is also applied where though the crime committed is considered to be of either a Hadd or Qisas nature, but the evidentiary requirements of either is not satisfied. 125 Further, it is also applied where there is some form of remission on the part of the offender before apprehension and prosecution by law enforcement agents of the State. An example of this latter situation would be where the robber for instance becomes remorseful, restores stolen property to the owner and thereby achieve reconciliation with the victim before arrest. The Hadd punishment will not be implemented in such a case. 126 Rather, the judge is at liberty to apply the 'rule of lenity' rather than the prescribed punishment for the ostensible crime committed. 127 This is particularly relevant because the evidentiary requirements of Huduud crimes, as mentioned earlier, are particularly stringent 128 in recognition of the need to maintain the higher level of certainty before the application of grievous punishment. In practice, many situations that should be punished as Hadd offences fall to be decided as Ta'zir crimes because of evidentiary issues or circumstances leaving room for more transformative experiences of offender encounters with the criminal justice system 129 and implicitly, increasing the scope for the active role of victims.
As Bassiouni has argued, Islamic law is not only compatible with transitional justice, but 'Islamic criminal law, by its very terms, demands action in post conflict situations.'
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Conclusion
Despite the prominence of religion and specifically Islam in the socio-political and cultural life of societies in the MENA, reference to integration of religion in transitional justice processes in the region is virtually absent in the emerging discourses and processes of transitional justice there. Yet, the strong historical affinity for Islam in the MENA makes it problematic to frame the critical project of transitional justice and conflict transformation in the region on foundations that excludes religion as is currently the case. For over fourteen centuries it has been difficult to conceive of religion in the historical sense in majority-Muslim societies like the MENA. Addressing impunity -the suffering and gross violations of human rights that have ensued from mostly actions of the state but also nonstate actors as a result of over six decades of authoritarianism and conflict in the MENA -is a pivotal step in instituting sustainable peace and development in the region. The main argument made in the foregoing is that taking account of religion in transitional justice measures is compelling in the MENA. A major challenge for transitional justice and conflict transformation measures has been the need to secure their legitimacy in subject societies to facilitate their acceptance and efficacy. In view of this, on-going changes in the MENA and engagement with them through transitional justice ought to be considered along with the institutionalised reference to Islam in 'the contemporary Muslim conscience'. 136 Specifically, it is important that Islam is engaged in the process of the design and implementation of transitional justice and conflict transformation measures in the region to ensure their viability and expand the opportunity for satisfaction with the rather limited dividends they tend to deliver. This approach empowers the societies in transition in the MENA in dealing with social change that has been initiated there. It broadens the appeal, legitimacy and efficacy of transitional justice measures in that critical part of the world. These are not simply desirable outcomes for the transitional justice project, but crucial to its currently challenged status as a viable endeavour in post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies.
